A bare plea of coercion does not rebut the presumption of consideration under Section 118(a).

The plaintiff sought recovery of ₹1,40,75,000, alleging that he advanced ₹82,00,000 to the defendant and obtained nine promissory notes.

The defendant admitted his signatures but contended that the notes were obtained under duress, without consideration, and arose from earlier borrowings by his father-in-law.

He also disputed territorial jurisdiction and pleaded limitation.

The plaintiff presented the plaint on 4 June 2018; two notes were dated 21 February 2015 and seven were dated 25 May 2015.

The Court framed issues including entitlement, limitation, territorial jurisdiction, and consideration.

The plaintiff examined himself and produced the notes and other documents; the defendant and his wife testified, but the defence produced no documents.

Section 118(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 raises a rebuttable presumption that a promissory note was made for consideration.

The defendant may rebut it on a preponderance of probabilities, including by relying on circumstances emerging from the plaintiff’s evidence; once a probable defence is raised, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove consideration, while a bare denial is insufficient.

Under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, where the limitation period expires while the Court is closed, a suit may be instituted on the day the Court reopens.

Clause 12 of the Letters Patent governed the Court’s original civil jurisdiction and leave to sue where only part of the cause of action arose within its limits.

Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure governed the discretionary award of interest; the Court considered the plaintiff’s delay in re-presenting the plaint when fixing the period for which interest would run.

The Court found that the place where the promissory notes were executed had not been established, but held that the legal notice issued from Chennai constituted part of the cause of action within its jurisdiction; leave under Clause 12 had also been obtained and not revoked.

The claims on the two February 2015 notes were time-barred because their three-year limitation period expired before presentation of the plaint, whereas the limitation period for the seven May 2015 notes expired during the Court’s summer vacation, making presentation on the reopening day timely under Section 4.

On consideration, the defendant’s account of earlier family borrowings and coercion was unsupported by documents or independent evidence; the alleged earlier borrower was not examined, and no police complaint concerning the alleged duress had been made.

The Court therefore held that the defence did not rebut the Section 118(a) presumption in respect of the seven notes.

It excluded the claims under the two time-barred notes and reduced the contractual 24% interest to simple interest at 12% per annum on the ₹75,00,000 principal.

It excluded interest for the period of delayed re-presentation, 20 June 2018 to 29 July 2019, as a matter of discretion under Section 34 CPC.

The defendant was directed to pay ₹1,29,00,000, comprising ₹75,00,000 principal and ₹54,00,000 pre-suit interest, together with simple interest at 12% per annum on ₹75,00,000 from 4 to 19 June 2018 and from 30 July 2019 to the date of decree, and thereafter until realisation.

The plaintiff was awarded proportionate costs; recovery under the two notes dated 21 February 2015 was denied as time-barred.