Forester Accused Of Taking ₹2,000 Bribe Keeps Acquittal As Orissa HC Refuses State Leave To Appeal

The State sought leave under Section 378 CrPC to appeal the acquittal of Hemanta Kumar Parija, a Forester, on charges under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d), punishable under Section 13(2), of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The prosecution alleged that, after a tractor-trolley carrying morum was intercepted for want of a transit permit, Parija demanded and accepted a bribe of Rs. 2,000 to secure its release and avoid prosecution.

In a vigilance trap, treated currency was recovered from his wallet and table, and the hand-wash solutions tested positive for phenolphthalein.

The trial court acquitted him, finding the prior demand and voluntary acceptance insufficiently proved, noting discrepancies in the currency recovery, and declining to raise the statutory presumption under Section 20.

The State challenged that acquittal, arguing that the evidence and circumstances established demand and acceptance.

Section 378 CrPC governs an appeal against acquittal.

Under the principles stated in Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., 2026 INSC 67, an acquittal should not be disturbed where the trial court’s view is a reasonable possible view; interference is warranted where the judgment is perverse, overlooks or misreads material evidence, or is clearly unreasonable.

Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 104, reiterates that acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence and requires a higher threshold for appellate interference.

Under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the presumption may be raised only after the prosecution establishes the foundational fact of acceptance or obtaining of gratification; the trial court found that foundation was not satisfactorily established in this case.

The High Court considered the State’s arguments about the complainant’s testimony, the recovered currency, and the positive hand-wash test, but assessed them against the trial court’s findings on the alleged demand, acceptance, and inconsistencies in the recovery evidence.

It held that the trial court’s assessment was not perverse or wholly unreasonable and that the possibility of another view did not itself justify overturning the acquittal.

Because the trial court’s view remained a possible one on the evidence, the strengthened presumption of innocence and the governing restraint in acquittal appeals precluded interference.

The State’s CRLLP was dismissed.