Orissa HC Refuses Leave To Appeal Cashier’s Acquittal In Alleged ₹500 Bribe Case Over Retiree’s No-Dues Certificate

The State sought leave to appeal under Section 378 CrPC against the acquittal of Hare Krushna Pandit, a clerk-cum-cashier, of offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d), read with Section 13(2), of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The prosecution alleged that the respondent demanded and accepted ₹500 from a retired Junior Engineer in connection with a No Due Certificate; the trap resulted in recovery of the tainted currency and positive hand-wash tests.

The trial court found recovery and the chemical tests proved, but held that demand and voluntary acceptance were not established beyond reasonable doubt.

It also noted that the respondent lacked authority to issue the certificate, no pending certificate file was seized from him, and departmental records raised questions about the complainant’s outstanding liabilities.

The State challenged the acquittal, relying on the complainant and corroborating witnesses, the recovery evidence, and the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Act.

Sections 7 and 13(1)(d), read with Section 13(2), of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, formed the basis of the charges; the State also relied on the presumption under Section 20, contending that the foundational facts had been established.

Under Section 378 CrPC, an appellate court considering an acquittal must respect the reinforced presumption of innocence: where two reasonable views are possible, it should not substitute its view for the trial court’s.

Interference is justified where the acquittal is perverse, clearly unreasonable, rests on a misreading or omission of material evidence, or where the evidence permits no conclusion other than guilt.

citing Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 INSC 67, and Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 104

The High Court considered the State’s submissions concerning the witness testimony, recovery, chemical tests, and Section 20 presumption, but held that the trial court’s assessment was not perverse or wholly unreasonable.

The trial court had distinguished proof of recovery and positive hand-wash tests from proof of demand and voluntary acceptance, and relied on the respondent’s limited role and the absence of a pending certificate file in his custody as circumstances creating reasonable doubt.

Because that assessment remained a possible view of the evidence, the State had not established the compelling grounds required to disturb the acquittal.

The criminal leave petition was dismissed.