More Than 15 Years After Acquittal, Orissa HC Refuses State Leave To Appeal In Forest Officer’s Disproportionate-Assets Case

In brief

The question

1. Whether the trial court’s assessment of the respondent’s assets, income and expenditure—and its resulting finding that disproportionate assets were not proved—was perverse or otherwise warranted appellate interference

The court held

The High Court declined to grant leave against the acquittal, finding no legal or factual basis to unsettle the trial court’s judgment

It also directed

The criminal leave petition was dismissed

01Facts

The respondent, a Forest Department officer, was charged with possessing assets disproportionate to his known sources of income during the relevant check period, following searches conducted on 25 March 1990

pp. 2–3

The prosecution initially calculated alleged disproportionate assets of Rs. 5,86,914.35

p. 3

After reassessing the assets, income and expenditure—including excluding certain properties attributed to the respondent’s father and accepting some claimed income—the trial court found that the respondent’s likely savings exceeded his assets and acquitted him of the charges under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Section 8(3) of the Orissa Special Courts Act, 2006

pp. 4–5

The State sought leave to appeal, challenging the trial court’s treatment of income-tax returns, property ownership, agricultural income and coconut-sale income

pp. 6–7

02Issues

i.1. Whether the trial court’s assessment of the respondent’s assets, income and expenditure—and its resulting finding that disproportionate assets were not proved—was perverse or otherwise warranted appellate interference

pp. 7–8, 11

ii.2. Whether leave to appeal against the acquittal should be granted in light of the principles governing appellate review of acquittals

pp. 8–11

03Law Applied

Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, provides the procedural basis for seeking appellate review of an acquittal.

Under Section 13(1)(e), read with Section 13(2), of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the prosecution must establish possession by a public servant of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to known sources of income; the trial court recited that, once such possession is established, the burden shifts to the public servant to account for it

p. 4

The court applied *Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka*, 2026 INSC 67, for the principles that an acquittal should not be disturbed where the trial court’s view is reasonably possible and that interference is warranted for patent perversity, material misreading or omission of evidence, or other compelling and substantial reasons

pp. 8–9

It also relied on *Mallappa v. State of Karnataka*, 2024 INSC 104, for the principle that acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence and requires a higher threshold for appellate interference

p. 10

Provisions in the judgment · 2 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 378

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 Section 13

04Reasoning

The High Court considered the State’s objections to the trial court’s treatment of the post-search tax returns, the properties associated with the respondent’s father and wife, and the claimed agricultural and coconut-sale income

pp. 6–7

Applying the restrictive standard for review of acquittals, it found that the trial court’s reassessment and conclusion were neither perverse nor wholly unreasonable; the possibility of another view did not itself justify reversal

pp. 10–11

In the absence of material misreading or omission, or compelling reasons to interfere, the strengthened presumption of innocence required the court to leave the acquittal undisturbed

pp. 10–12