01Facts
The petitioner, RVUNL, a Rajasthan government undertaking, and the respondent, PKCL, a joint venture company, were parties to a Coal Mining and Delivery Agreement (CMDA) dated 16.07.2008, with an Addendum dated 22.09.2010.
¶ 13–15After the Supreme Court cancelled coal block allocations in 2014, the PEKB block was reallocated to RVUNL under the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015.
¶ 17–20The CMDA was adopted under Section 11(1) of that Act, and a Supplementary Agreement was executed on 29.07.2016.
¶ 17–20PKCL invoked arbitration over nine claims.
¶ 22–23The Sole Arbitrator (Justice Sudhir Kumar Katriar, retd.) passed an Award on 15.01.2021, allowing Claims 1–4, 6, 7, allowing Claim 5 in part, rejecting the fifth-village part of Claim 8 as premature, and awarding interest at 11.95% on Claim 9.
¶ 24On PKCL's Section 33(4) application, an Additional Award dated 05.07.2021 allowed the four-village part of Claim 8 (Rs. 66.70 crore) with interest.
¶ 25–26The Commercial Court, on RVUNL's Section 34 challenge, set aside both awards in their entirety, holding it had no power to modify them.
¶ 27The High Court, under Section 37 on PKCL's appeal, held the Commercial Court had exceeded its jurisdiction and restored both awards.
¶ 28–29RVUNL filed the present SLP under Article 136.
¶ 29RVUNL's attempt to press objections to Claims 1, 3, 5 and 9 without a cross-objection was raised, but the High Court's interim order on that point was recalled.
¶ 32–3402Issues
i.1. Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 to interfere with the High Court's Section 37 judgment restoring the arbitral awards.
¶ 5–6, 10(a), 11ii.2. Whether RVUNL, having filed no Section 37 appeal or cross-objection, could challenge the Tribunal's findings on Claims 1, 3, 5 and 9 before the High Court.
¶ 32–35iii.3. Whether the Arbitral Tribunal's findings on Claims 1 to 9 are free from patent illegality or perversity, such that the Commercial Court exceeded Section 34 in setting them aside (Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8) and the High Court correctly restored them.
¶ 36–44, 11iv.4. Whether the Additional Award on Claim 8 was beyond the Tribunal's functus officio status, and whether the Commercial Court could set it aside on limitation, a plea not raised before the Tribunal.
¶ 43A–43Fv.5. Whether the awards are severable, or whether the matter should be remanded for a claim-wise severability exercise.
¶ 45–45C03Law Applied
Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and is to be exercised sparingly, only in exceptional circumstances, as the award attains finality at the Section 37 stage, drawing on DMRC Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd.
¶ 6–7, 10(a)Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 permits setting aside only on the grounds in Section 34(2), (2-A) and Explanation 2 to Section 34(2)(b), and the proviso to Section 34(2-A) bars setting aside for erroneous application of law or reappreciation of evidence.
¶ 10(b)–(e), 49The patent illegality doctrine from Associate Builders v. DDA and Ssangyong Engineering v. NHAI provides that an award is perverse only where based on no evidence, irrelevant material, or ignoring vital evidence, and a plausible contractual construction by the arbitrator under Section 28(3) must not be interfered with.
¶ 8–9, 10(f)Section 37 is akin to Section 34, is confined to the same grounds, and does not permit reappraisal on merits, as laid down in Jan De Nul Dredging India v. Tuticorin Port Trust.
¶ 9, 10(g)Section 31(3) requires reasons, and Section 33(4) permits an additional award for claims omitted from the original award.
¶ 37E, 43AA plea of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law that cannot be raised for the first time under Section 34.
¶ 43FSection 21 of the Limitation Act and the Article 137 framework apply as explained in State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises.
¶ 40C, 40ESeverance arises only if some part of an award is invalid, as articulated in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft.
¶ 34, 45A, 45CContractual construction was governed by CMDA Clauses 3.2.1, 3.4.1, 4.3.3, 5.4.1, 6.3, 7.1, 7.3, 9.2 and 13.1, the Supplementary Agreement cl. (j)–(k), and Sections 70 and 230 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
¶ 15, 37B, 38B, 40BProvisions in the judgment · 12 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Section 21Section 28Section 31Section 33Section 34Section 37Section 75Section 81
Electricity Act, 2003 Section 62
Indian Contract Act, 1872 Section 70Section 73Section 230
04Reasoning
Article 136 is not an integral part of the arbitration framework, and interference with arbitral awards is an exception.
¶ 6The High Court's omnibus approach was held insufficient, and the Supreme Court undertook a claim-by-claim review to determine whether each Tribunal finding was within a plausible view.
¶ 31, 36, 47On Claim 1 (rejected coal rakes), the Tribunal's view that consumption before test reports amounted to acceptance, and its use of contra proferentem, were held plausible; the Commercial Court's own acceptance of these views and the evidentiary findings made re-appreciation impermissible.
¶ 37GOn Claim 2 (stamp duty), the Commercial Court wrongly read "adversely" in isolation from "directly" in Clause 7.1 and substituted its own construction; the Tribunal's construction was one that a fair-minded person could adopt, so the Commercial Court exceeded its jurisdiction.
¶ 38G(ii)–(iii)On Claim 3 (interest rate), the Tribunal's finding that the contractual SBI rate was unavailable and that the 11.95% rate was reasonable was concurrently upheld and was not perverse.
¶ 39FOn Claim 4 (legal fees), the Tribunal's limitation finding, based on the re-examination correspondence and refusal on 19.02.2018, was reasoned; the Commercial Court had reappreciated evidence to reach a contrary conclusion, which went beyond Section 34.
¶ 40F(iii)On Claim 5 (bank guarantee charges), the Tribunal's reading of "all charges" in cl. (k) was concurrently upheld, and RVUNL's reliance on cl. (j) was rejected as a new case not raised before the Tribunal.
¶ 41FOn Claims 6 and 7 (additional PAFs and vocational training centre), the Tribunal's scope-of-work and change-in-law constructions were possible views, and the Commercial Court therefore erred in interfering.
¶ 42FOn Claim 8, the Tribunal rightly held that the four-village claim had escaped adjudication, so Section 33(4) applied; the Commercial Court's limitation ground was impermissible because limitation was not pleaded before the Tribunal, is a mixed question of fact and law, and could not be decided under Section 34.
¶ 43FOn Claim 9 (interest and costs), the discretionary 11.95% rate was a plausible view and costs were consequential.
¶ 44FBecause no part of the awards was invalid, severability and remand did not arise.
¶ 45CSome findings might admit another view, but that is not the test under Sections 34 and 37.
¶ 48, 4905Holding
Neither the Tribunal's findings nor the Commercial Court's view on Claims 1, 3, 5 and 9 disclosed patent illegality or perversity, and the Commercial Court exceeded its Section 34 jurisdiction on Claims 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8.
¶ 46(i)–(ii), 50No ground under Article 136 was found to interfere with the High Court's judgment, and the cross-objection question was not decided.
¶ 35, 50The SLP was dismissed, with no order as to costs, and the High Court's restoration of the Award dated 15.01.2021 and the Additional Award dated 05.07.2021 stands; pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
¶ 50Original Court PDF
Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited,vsParsa Kente Collieries Limited
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