Supreme CourtArbitration and MediationAdministrative and Public Law

Supreme Court Restores Dredging Award Against Kolkata Port Trust, Says Bills Above 70% Of Original Contract Don't Alone Shock Conscience

M/S Marino Dredgeco Limitedv.The Board Of Trustees Of The Port Of Kolkata

Supreme Court Restores Dredging Award Against Kolkata Port Trust, Says Bills Above 70% Of Original Contract Don't Alone Shock Conscience. M/S Marino Dredgeco Limited vs The Board Of Trustees Of The Port Of Kolkata. Supreme Court. LawLens
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In brief

The question

1. Whether the Division Bench, exercising jurisdiction under Section 37, was justified in modifying the arbitral award on the sole ground that the additional-work claim exceeded 70% of the original contract value and shocked the judicial conscience.

The court held

The Division Bench's modification of the award on the "shock the conscience" ground, based only on the 70% ratio and the awarder's Government status, was outside the jurisdiction conferred by Section 37 and not in consonance with the grounds under the Act.

It also directed

The impugned judgment of the Division Bench is set aside, the contractor's appeal (C.A. No. 14303 of 2026) is allowed, and the arbitral award dated 03.11.2003 is restored in full.

The Port Trust's appeal (C.A. No. 14304 of 2026) is disposed of accordingly, as the impugned order was already set aside.

Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

01Facts

The contractor (Marino Dredgeco) performed dredging of the approach channel and basin for a shore-based pilot station at Sagar Island under a contract with the Port Trust.

The original contract value was Rs. 2,86,56,200, of which Rs. 2,79,32,865 was admittedly paid.

¶ 6 · ¶ 7

The Port Trust's letter dated 19.07.2000 entrusted additional work, which the contractor attributed to force majeure weather conditions, 100% siltation, and a mismatch between the soil data supplied by the Port Trust and actual soil conditions, along with the Port Trust's failure to construct protective walls.

¶ 3 · ¶ 6 · ¶ 7

The channel was inaugurated on 17.04.2001.

¶ 3 · ¶ 6

The Port Trust contends that no completion certificate was issued, that no additional work was entrusted, and that the contract was terminated.

¶ 5

The Arbitrator passed an award dated 03.11.2003, which the Single Judge upheld under Section 34.

¶ 6

On appeal under Section 37, the Division Bench modified the award by reducing the amount payable to 50% of the sum quantified and reducing interest to 6% on the principal from 08.02.2002. It did so on the ground that the claim for additional work exceeded 70% of the original contract value, which it held shocked the judicial conscience, though it recorded that the award was not perverse, patently illegal, or based on no evidence.

¶ 2 · ¶ 8

The Division Bench also found that the completion certificate was not issued by the Port Trust and that the award rested on joint measurements and pre- and post-work levels.

¶ 8

02Issues

i.1. Whether the Division Bench, exercising jurisdiction under Section 37, was justified in modifying the arbitral award on the sole ground that the additional-work claim exceeded 70% of the original contract value and shocked the judicial conscience.

¶ 2 · ¶ 8 · ¶ 10

ii.2. Whether the entire award should be set aside, or alternatively, whether it may be partially set aside, on the ground that it is against public interest.

¶ 4 · ¶ 11 · ¶ 12

iii.3. Whether the absence of a completion certificate under the GCC disentitles the contractor to payment for work actually executed and billed.

¶ 5 · ¶ 8

iv.4. Whether the awarder's status as a Government entity justifies reducing the quantum of an award that is otherwise valid.

¶ 13

03Law Applied

The Court applied Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which confine courts to the grounds for setting aside awards and bar merits review.

¶ 12

Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI (2019) 15 SCC 131: after the 2015 Amendment, the "most basic notions of morality or justice" ground (shocking the conscience) requires a substantive reason that blatantly and patently conflicts with those notions, and is not satisfied by lip service.

¶ 9

Somdatt Builders–NCC–NEC (JV) v. NHAI (2025) 6 SCC 757: the High Court under Section 37 cannot set aside an award by invoking phrases such as "public policy," "patent illegality," or "shocking the conscience" without substantive reasons.

¶ 10

Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. (2025 INSC 605): partial setting aside is permitted only where the valid and invalid portions are legally and practically severable and not intertwined.

¶ 11

Pam Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (2019) 8 SCC 112: Government and private parties must be treated equally in arbitral matters.

¶ 13

Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd. v. HPCL (2024) 2 SCC 375 was held inapplicable because it concerned damages, not invoices for additional work.

¶ 5

Provisions in the judgment · 2 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Section 34Section 37

04Reasoning

The Division Bench's modification rested solely on the ratio of the additional-work claim to the original contract, without examining the nature of the additional work or the measurements and invoices underlying the quantification.

¶ 8 · ¶ 10

Because the Division Bench itself found the award based on adequate evidence and not perverse or patently illegal, the shock-the-conscience ground was not substantively established under Ssangyong and Somdatt.

¶ 8 · ¶ 9 · ¶ 10

The Port Trust's argument that the claim was against public interest did not satisfy the statutory grounds, and the Court rejected the plea to set aside the award entirely.

¶ 4 · ¶ 12

Partial setting aside under Gayatri Balasamy was unavailable because the quantification rested on a single character of re-dredging work and was not divisible into "valid" and "invalid" parts.

¶ 11 · ¶ 12

The absence of a completion certificate did not defeat payment, since the Division Bench had found that the contractor's documentary proof of work carried out was valid.

¶ 8

The awarder's Government status could not justify reducing the award, as this would breach the equality principle in Pam Developments.

¶ 13

The Division Bench had effectively adjudicated the merits by reviewing the quantum, which Sections 34 and 37 do not permit, and the nature of the work (re-dredging to keep the channel operational) was consistent with the original dredging contract.

¶ 12 · ¶ 14

05Holding

The Division Bench's modification of the award on the "shock the conscience" ground, based only on the 70% ratio and the awarder's Government status, was outside the jurisdiction conferred by Section 37 and not in consonance with the grounds under the Act.

¶ 8 · ¶ 13 · ¶ 14

The impugned judgment of the Division Bench is set aside, the contractor's appeal (C.A. No. 14303 of 2026) is allowed, and the arbitral award dated 03.11.2003 is restored in full.

¶ 15

The Port Trust's appeal (C.A. No. 14304 of 2026) is disposed of accordingly, as the impugned order was already set aside.

¶ 16

Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

¶ 17
Supreme Court

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M/S Marino Dredgeco LimitedvsThe Board Of Trustees Of The Port Of Kolkata

Supreme Court · November 18, 2026

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